Ophthalmomyiasis is pathology of eye due to presence of fly larva, which rarely occurs in the world, and most cases has been reported in developing countries. These days incidence of Ophthalmomyiasis has been decreased in Iran. Most cases of Ophthalmomyiasis caused by presence of fly Larvae Oestrus Ovis.In summer 2011, a fourty year old rural woman with a good hygine presented to Ophthalmology department of Rouhani Hospital. She had no background of any disease.After physical examination EXTERNAL Ophthalmomyiasis was diagnosed. all seven larva has been removed, Topical antibiotic and corticosteroid were prescribed for daily use. Two days later in follow up the eye was asymptomatic.

“Subjective PROPOSITION” is one of the terms that are introduced in Islamic Logic and used in Islamic Philosophy. In this paper, I investigate the term’s history and show that the subjective PROPOSITION has had many meanings in different times and had been associated with many different kinds of PROPOSITIONs. This variety and changes in meaning have caused the subjective PROPOSITION to encounter many ambiguities both in Islamic Logic and Islamic Philosophy. In this paper, I have tried to formulate the meanings of the subjective PROPOSITION by Symbolic Logic, and thereby to provide the possibility of assessing the term. In this process, we can have a better device to test the accuracy of the claims on the subjective PROPOSITION and the correctness of its use in Logic and Philosophy.

Aristotle in his logical works, in addition to the statement, introduces the concept of PROPOSITION and defines it based on affirmation and negation in Prior Analytics. There are two issues about Aristotle's view of preposition, i.e., the interpretation of its definition, and its relation to the statement. In this article, first, three interpretations of preposition, including Alexander of Aphrodisias' and classical ones, are discussed and criticized. And because Aristotle points to the relation between contradiction and PROPOSITION, first, the definition of contradiction from Aristotle's point of view and, then, its relation to PROPOSITION are discussed. Finally, my interpretation of PROPOSITION is explained: PROPOSITION is a statement which its relation with contradiction is considered and the attention to this relation leads to the acceptation of the rule of contradiction which is the foundation of each deduction. The linguistics meaning of PROPOSITION is compatible with this interpretation: PROPOSITION is to propose one side of contradiction, and because of this, the dialectical PROPOSITION has two forms: question form the answerer and its replay as a premise in dialectical deduction.

Avicenna has aimed to establisha harmonized philosophical system that incorporates logic, epistemology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and other types of knowledge. Although he has not directly written anything about the metaphysical foundations of science, we believe that there are some implications in his philosophy that could be considered astruthmakers of scientific PROPOSITIONs. As natural law is significantly correlated to “experiment”, we will first discuss the epistemological aspect of experiments in Avicennian philosophy. He believes that the observation of a repeated event could lead us to a causal relationship due to the fact that accidental events are neither permanent nor frequent. Following that, the logical approach which corresponds to this epistemology will be introduced. As Avicenna’s logic does not directly consider such an approach, we are to derive it from apparently disconnected chapters and then formulate them. It will be indicated that Avicenna has been aware of the differences between PROPOSITIONs that merely refer to existent instances and ones that consider the nature of instances. The latter obviously could refer to both existent instances and hypothetical instances. Finally, we present some points in his metaphysics that could establisha metaphysical basis for PROPOSITIONs concerning natural law. In addition, we will indicate that Avicenna’s system is able to justify the counterfactual conditionals that relate to laws of nature.

In his various works, Ibn Sina has referred to different meanings of "All J is B", which his followers have called "ḥaqīqī" and "khārijī" PROPOSITIONs. Ibn Sina's examples for "khārijī PROPOSITION" are sometimes only related to the present time, sometimes related to past and present times, and his followers have extended these meanings to all three tenses: past, present, and future. To distinguish these three meanings, which have arranged from specific to general, I call them "specific," "intermediate," and "general" khārijī PROPOSITIONs. In this article, I show that for each meaning of khārijī PROPOSITION, its relation to a more general meaning of khārijī is similar to its relation to ḥaqīqī PROPOSITIONs, in that mixed khārijī-khārijī syllogisms (mixed of two kinds of khārijīs) have exactly the same rules as mixed khārijī-ḥaqīqī syllogisms.

In this article, at first, I have explained correspondence theory of truth and I have dealt with its problems. Then I have explained the truth maker principle in the light of correspondence theory of truth. At the end, I have discussed how this theory can support negative PROPOSITION.

Aristotle defined a PROPOSITION as to be either true or false (ṣādiq aw kāẓib). But Avicenna, who mentioned the Aristotelian definition in all his books, except in his latest book, Pointers and Reminders, deviated from Aristotle’s and defined a PROPOSITION according to the truthfulness and lying of his “utterer.” (The compoisition which yields an assertion and which is one whose utterer is called “truthful” in what he says, or “a liar”). (Avicenna 1984, Inati’s translation, p. 77, ll. 222-223). This means that “ṣādiq” and “kāẓib” are the description of the utterer and not of the propostion itself, and this is contrary to the definition of Aristotle and of Avicenna himself in all previous works, which consider “ṣādiq” and “kāẓib” to be the description of the utterer and not the propostion. Some contemporaries have proposed reasons for Avicenna's shift from the first definition to the second one, and while reporting them, I show that the attribution of none of them to Avicenna is documented. On the contrary, I present a new reason that the probability of referring to Avicenna is not less, if not more, and that is that the words “ṣādiq” and “kāẓib” in ancient Arabic (before the Graeco-Arabic translation movement) did not mean what “true” and “false” and their equivalents mean in English and other languages, but that they meant “truthful” and “liar” and their equivalents mean in English and other languages.

this paper evaluates attitudes of Iranians toward crossing red traffic lights and their sensitivity to fines. Economic theory of crime under expected utility predicts that because of the possibility of severe punishments, risk adverse individuals would not cross red lights. This is implied by the Becker PROPOSITION. However, among 262 individuals surveyed, more than half of the sample has previous records of conviction with respect to traffic laws. The result indicates that the effect of introducing a new fine on pedestrians is about twice the effect of increasing the existing fine on drivers by 150%. The elasticity of crossing red lights with respect to fine hike is-0. 25. Regression analysis shows that previous record of breaking traffic laws, being single and crossing red lights by cars are significant explanatory variables for decision to do jaywalking.